EMAG

The independent action group for current and ex Equitable Life policyholders, funded by contributions.

Equitable Members Action Group

Equitable Members Action Group Limited, a company limited by guarantee, number 5471535 registered in the UK

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Correspondence: 12/11/2002 - Letter to John Tiner and Roger Allen of the FSA from Alex Henny regarding the lack of information provided by the Equitable to its members

12 November '02 - To John Tiner and Roger Allen of the FSA from Alex Henny

Dear Messrs. Tiner and Allen,

A complaint regarding the lack of information provided by the Equitable to its members

  1. I was holding this letter until we received the interim accounts to make any appropriate comment on them. The accounts (up to 20 June) were promised in October, but October is coming late this year. I imagine you are well aware that companies normally get their interims out 6-8 weeks after the end of the period.

  2. I imagine that you would agree that one of the root causes of the difficulties of the Equitable Life was the inadequate provision of information about the situation of the with-profits fund both to prospective members and to existing members. You are well aware that one of the key strands of your With-Profits Review has been to stress the importance of providing customers of insurance products in general, and with-profits policies in particular, with adequate information both before and after point of sale.

  3. The original objective of the Equitable Members Action Group was: "to support with-profits members in making informed decisions on the best long-term future of members". You will see from our re-designed website www.emag.org.uk that EMAG still strives to obtain and publish information of help to policyholders (past and present) of every hue. We were thus pleased when Mr. Treves wrote in an open letter published in various newspapers on 1 March 2001 that:-

    "I will communicate openly. This is our Society and members are entitled to know everything about how it is run unless open disclosure would be commercially damaging…I look forward to an atmosphere of trust and transparency between the policyholders and our Society".

  4. In similar vein the Annual Report and Accounts for 2001 claimed that "The Board is committed to a policy of openness in communication with policyholders". Notwithstanding those claims, he and the chief executive, Mr. Charles Thomson, have consistently obstructed us achieving our objective. The members have been subject to obfuscation, some misinformation, and much spin for the whole period since Mr. Treves became chairman. I provide you with nine examples:

    (i) Inadequate information on the Halifax Equitable deal. Your colleague Michael Foot once told me he could see no reason why members should not be provided with information about the deal. We were provided with some information by way of the draft heads of terms, but no figures which would allow us to judge whether it was in our interests, nor the level of costs we could expect for the services that HBOS would render us. (It seems that these costs are high). I wrote to you about this issue, and attach the relevant extract from the letter, see attachment 1.

    (ii) No quantification nor background for the reduction in policy values by 16% on 16 July 2001. The information provided to the policyholders (open letter to the members of Equitable, 16 July 2001) merely stated:-

    • Stockmarkets have fallen heavily over the last 18 months;
    • Maturity values now significantly exceed the value of the investments underlying maturing policies;
    • As a mature fund, a large number of policyholders are currently retiring and taking their benefits.

The fall of the stock market at that point accounted for only about 5% of the reduction in value of the fund - could we not have been advised of this? Why did we have to wait until December 2001 for the Independent Actuary's report in the Compromise to tell us that the fund had been 10% over-valued at 31/12/2000? And what is the relevance of the third point? Was it a euphemism for the fact that it took Mr. Thomson so long to appreciate that members who took contracted exits in the first half of 2001 received (we estimate) about £200m more than their asset share?

Mr. Treves and Mr. Thomson provided the following reasons for not providing adequate information about the value reductions:-

  • "it would be too expensive" - in the context of £4,000 million, too expensive? Given the large legal fees incurred by the Society and how much is spent on Burson Marseller to "manage" information, the response cannot be regarded as serious

  • "it would involve too much work" - yet either there was a directors' summary, which could have been provided or, as has since been claimed, the directors had no summary in which case it is difficult to see how they could have taken on a £4bn decision

  • "the press would misinterpret it" - even if that were true, it should not prevent the publication of information to which the members are entitled

  • "it would assist claims against former directors or advisers" - an incomprehensible reason

  • "the auditors would not allow it" - why not? who pays their fees? complete nonsense

  • "no other with profit office does it" - no other with profits office is in the mess in which the Equitable is

    I hope you will agree with us that providing such a set of ill founded reasons to members is not compatible with the spirit, if not the ruling, of the message you are conveying in your Review.

    (iii) Omissions in the Compromise Document. We commissioned Professor David Blake to prepare a report for us entitled "An Assessment of the Adequacy And Objectivity of the Information Provided by the Board of the Equitable Life Assurance Society in Connection with the Compromise Scheme Proposals of 6 December 2001". Professor Blake asked:-

    "Is the information provided the most up-to-date available? Most of the information in the above documents is now nearly six months old. In the interests of transparency and full disclosure, the following additional information is needed: a statement of affairs at November 30 providing information on:-

    • Number of policyholders (both GAR and non-GAR) still in the fund
    • Value of the fund
    • Solvency level of the fund
    • Fund available for appropriations."

    Mr. Thomson rubbished Professor Blake's report, alleging in a letter to the FT that Professor Blake had not seen certain information. Professor Blake had seen the information. He also alleged that "Blake had made mistakes in all of his first five paragraphs". Despite two courteous and precise requests from Professor Blake, Mr. Thomson did not substantiate his allegation. Subsequently the Society has relied on Mr. Justice Lloyd's views on the matter - despite his lack of academic expertise in Professor Blake's field and his seeming lack of awareness of the possibility of using the press or the internet to update members inexpensively.

    (iv) The Equitable's attempt to hide its solvency return in May 2002 until after the AGM. As you know the Equitable was obliged to provide its solvency return in digitised form to the FSA by 30 April 2002. During May EMAG, the Financial Times, the Daily Mail and some consulting actuaries tried to obtain a copy of the return before the AGM on 27/5/02. All were fobbed off by the Equitable. Finally, after all postal votes would have been despatched, on 24 May we read:-

    "The Financial Times was last night supplied with a full copy of the statutory solvency return after making repeated requests to Equitable. The mutual said that it had wanted to wait before distributing copies until they were available to everyone from Companies House".

    At the AGM the Society's chief investment officer and finance director, Mr. Charles Bellringer incorrectly claimed that the reason for the delay in providing the solvency return was due to a delay by the FSA in providing it to Companies House, from where members and journalists could request it. Yet by virtue of Rule 9.7 of the interim "Prudential Source Book: Insurers", policyholders have a right to receive "deposited documents" once they are deposited. There was nothing stopping the Society from providing the information to those who asked for it - and we had.

    One is bound to ask whether the responsible officers of the Society were trying to hide the Society's weak solvency position and its reliance on financial engineering to scrape by.

    (v) A consistent refusal to publish the number of members. We have on a number of occasions asked for - and on each occasion been refused - the number of members. We then thought that we would count the register. The Equitable made it as difficult as possible, saying we could only see it in Aylesbury for two hours a day and have access to one terminal - compare this with Mr. Treves' fine words quoted in paragraph 2 above. Attachment 2 is a letter I wrote to the relevant official in the Company Law Bill Team, see attachment 2. As of November 2002, the most recent count we have is for 16 months ago and the Society refused to provide the qualified member voting base at the time of the AGM.

    (vi) Information not provided in the Annual Report & Accounts and at the AGM. At the AGM I asked for information which was not provided in the Annual Report & Accounts. The information was not provided, and so I wrote to Mr. Treves on 13 June setting out a request for the following information (see attachment 3):-

    • in laymen's terms an analysis of the with-profits fund's available assets together with a comparison between, on the one hand, the available assets and, on the other hand, aggregate policy values, where the latter are differentiated between guaranteed and non-guaranteed elements and the annuitants
    • a proper analysis of the fund's performance i.e. return by asset class the membership issue
    • the nature and implications of the GIR issue

    You are no doubt well aware that in your reports on the With-Profits Review you clearly indicated that the first two pieces of information should be available. And I imagine you would not disagree that information about GIRs should be available as it is a material risk to the Society. I attach the most unsatisfactory reply I received, see attachment 4. When I received it I was very angry and told Mr. Treves that I regarded it as "contemptible drivel".

    (vii) Failure to provide information under article 65 of the Society's Memorandum and Articles of Association. You are aware that we suffered two further policy value reductions this year. Knowing that we would be provided with little or no information, we checked the Society's Memorandum and found that article 65 reads as follows:-

    "The Directors shall at such intervals as they deem expedient but at least once every three years…cause an investigation to be made into the financial condition of the Society…by the Actuary…the Directors report to the Members upon the results of the valuation".

    I wrote to Mr. Thomson on 5 September and drew his attention to the article and to the OED's definition of the relevant meaning of the word "report" and commented "While the Directors have made statements, they have not reported in the proper meaning of the word on the investigations made into the financial condition of the Society that led to cuts in policy value of July 2001, April 2002, July 2002. I would be obliged if you would provide the members of the Society with the reports as required by the Articles of Association by publishing them on the website.

    I received the following reply from the Society's new head of press relations and corporate communications, Mr. Tony McGarahan on 16 September:

    "The investigation under Article 65 is the annual valuation of the Society; published in the returns to the FSA, formerly to the Insurance Directorate. This document is on the Society's website."

    On 7 October, after talking to Mr. Roger Allen, I wrote to Mr. Treves (see attachment 5), reciting the two letters and then pointing out (among other things) that:-

  • the Directors' Report dated 15th April 2002 refers to "Valuation and bonus declaration", which was obviously not the solvency return

  • Article 65 refers to a "Directors' report to members", not one to a regulatory authority and quite distinct from the Accounts prepared under Article 64. It also states "Provided that in the valuation of the assets the values thereof be not estimated beyond the market prices [if any] of the same ..." which clearly implies that future income should not be included. The solvency return includes future income

  • Mr. Allen advised me that solvency returns "are not used for valuing the assets and declaring bonuses. Valuation and bonuses are worked out from first principles. They [i.e. solvency returns] are not a tool in that process

  • recently, another day and another (and slightly more elaborate) story from McGarahan, which is attachment 4. We are now taking legal advice on the issue

    This pathetic little episode shows the depths to which the Board will go to hide information from the members.

    (viii) Recently, our general secretary sought policy clarification of whether the GIR accrues daily both for on-going contracts and for non-contractual departures. The written reply was typical: "The Society is not prepared to discuss circumstances surrounding other clients policies….I feel that no useful purpose will be served by any further correspondence on this matter." So, the Society's policy basis of accrual of GIRs remains unexplained to its members (we would have put the answer on our website).

    (ix) Basis of valuation of members leaving the fund. We have repeatedly been alerted by departing members to the refusal by the Society to provide substantiation for the payment figure received. The FSA has refused to intervene. Several such cases, when brought to the attention of quality newspapers have resulted in an immediate hike in payment and admission of mistake. Any respectable financial institution must surely provide chapter and verse on the calculation of a final fund payout?

  1. I could provide more evidence, but trust you will consider that I have provided enough - if not more than enough - to make the point about how the Society keeps members in the dark. The result of that policy is that policyholders are not provided with the information that they need to make informed judgments about their financial futures, while those who are annuitants have received no explanation of their prospects.

  2. If Mr. Treves, Mr. Thomson, et al were running a tight ship, they might get away with secrecy. But they give the appearance of not knowing what they are doing - other than cutting members' policy values:-
  • Last year they ignored EMAG's suggestion for resolving the GIR issue along with the GAR issue, and so are now reduced to writing bonus statements and concurrently reducing policy values

  • They ignored our suggestion last year for treating non-GAR members more equitably by spreading the 16% reduction pro-rata the non-contractual bonuses, and returning the investments of the late joiners. Now we have the Bacon & Woodrow actuarial report; ELJAG; and the prospect of yet another expensive Section 425 scheme of arrangement

  • Mr. Thomson dismissed as impractical our suggestion that those who wished could give up their GIR and switch into what would be effectively a unit linked managed fund. Instead, with actuarial blinkers, Mr. Treves and Mr. Thomson wrote on 15/4/02 "The Society aims to return to running a conventional with-profits fund". That was an unrealistic objective, the absurdity of which was rapidly revealed in a cut in policy values two months later and a switch out of equities to a position of just a 5% holding and no prospect of any material reversal. As Mr. Thomson does not appear to have a grasp of the obvious we have commissioned Mr. Ned Cazalet to report on the issue, and will be publishing once we receive the Interim Accounts

    We were told regarding the Compromise:-

    "This represents to me the end of the crisis. It may not be nirvana, but we would have stability and the prospect of growth". Treves reported on 21/9/01.

    "We will have a more strong bonus policy. We will have a stronger investment flexibility", Treves on Money Box on 12/1/02.

    "Equitable Life has vowed to splash out £4bn buying shares". (Mr. Thomson as reported in the Times, 7/01/02).

    And pigs can fly.


I believe that sooner or later there is bound to be a full and proper independent investigation of the way in which the Equitable has been managed and supervised not only before the departure of the old Board but also since then. One purpose of this letter is to ensure that there will then be no doubt about the extent to which EMAG has raised with the FSA our concerns about the inadequacy of the provision by the Society of relevant information to policyholders over the past two years and the continuing inadequacy of such provision of information. More immediately the letter is intended to express EMAG's hope that, in line with the fine words in the FSA's documents, the FSA will now act to help ensure that the members of Equitable receive the information to which they are entitled.

This letter is written with the agreement of the Committee of EMAG. For your information it is the only properly constituted Action Group representing policyholders with a constitution, an elected Committee, a register of paid-up members, and a non-trivial bank balance.

Yours sincerely.

ALEX HENNEY

c.c. EMAG Committee, EMAG website, Equitable Board, various journalists, various MPs, Mr. Allan Asher, Director of Campaigns, Consumers' Association, and Mr. Hugh Burns, Penrose Inquiry.


ATTACHMENT 1

Extract from a letter to John Tiner, dated 17 January


The ELAS/Halifax deal

I write on behalf of the Committee of EMAG.

On February 9 2001 members of EMAG (and EPHAG) met with Mr. James Crosby, Chief Executive of the Halifax (now HBOS) and with Mr. Headdon, formerly the Chief Executive of ELAS. This meeting followed the deal whereby Halifax took over various operations of ELAS.

It seemed to the members of the EMAG Committee attending the meeting that we had a right to be provided with figures that would enable us to judge the deal, and furthermore a right to figures about the additional future costs we would incur for Clerical & Medical to manage our funds going forward. To this end I prepared a letter which was tabled, see attached. After the meeting Mr. Crosby mentioned to Mr. Vincent Nolan, then chairman of EMAG, that he thought we were entitled to the figures.

In the event Halifax agreed that ELAS could put on its website a letter dated 28 January 2001 setting out the principal terms on which Halifax was prepared to negotiate, but it did not provide any quantified answers to our questions . Subsequently I raised the matter with Mr. Treves, and he agreed we should have the figures but he would need to get clearance from the Halifax. In a letter dated 8 August I wrote to him wondering how the matter was progressing. He responded on 9 August saying that "We asked the Halifax for their consent to make the full agreements with them available to anybody who wanted to see them as long ago as 8 June. We have reminded them as recently as a few days ago, but have not yet heard. As soon as we do, I will let you know". On 4 September I wrote to Mr. Crosby raising the matter and enclosing my letter of 9 February. I did not have the courtesy of a reply, so I wrote again on 20 September, and the following day was told that Mr. Abercrombie, the Chief Executive of Clerical & Medical was dealing with it. After several weeks, I still had no reply so I telephoned Mr. Abercrombie and after several calls we talked. Mr. Abercrombie commented that there was material in the agreement that was commercially confidential to the Halifax. I stressed we wanted the information that related to our concerns which we could not imagine was confidential to Halifax. In due course I received a letter from Mr. Baines which is corporate blather, see attached. Mr. Nolan wrote again to Mr. Crosby and received an unsatisfactory reply (see attached). Mr. Crosby's word does not seem to be his bond.


ATTACHMENT 2

13th August, 2002.

Ms. Anne Scrope
Company Law Bill Team
DTI
4 Abbey Orchard Street
London SW1P 2HT.


Dear Ms. Scrope,

Access to company registers

As I mentioned to you, the Equitable is constituted under the Companies Act (as is Standard Life). When EMAG approached the Equitable to seek access to the list of members, Equitable made it as difficult as possible subject to doing the minimum necessary to comply with the Regulations. (I attach their response to our request). The Society hold the list electronically, and could have offered to provide access at its head office in London; the limitation to one terminal is quite unnecessary because with people on holiday there must be a number of free terminals in Aylesbury; and likewise the limitation to two hours is quite unnecessary other than as a means of obstructing us in our intention to discover how many members the Society has.

I also mentioned to you that when we asked for the whole register 18 months ago we were provided with a CD Rom for nothing. When we asked for it this January, the new Board wished to charge us some £7000 to provide hard copy, which was not only expensive but also very inconvenient to mailshot members. While we are mindful of the scope for abuse of registers of shareholders (which we hope is guarded by the Data Protection Act), we believe that access to the register should be made convenient to the owners (i.e. be they shareholders of a "normal" company or members of a mutual) of a company for proper purposes relating to the conduct of the company or the interests of the owners. The convenience should cover location and hours of access, and also in provision of the register in electronic form when the register is held electronically. The cost should reflect cutting a CD or shipping data over a modem. I note that paras 2.29 and 2.30 of "Modernising Company Law" stresses the benefits of electronic communications.

You may be interested to know that to facilitate competition in electricity each Regional Electricity Company (like London Electricity) has to provide on request to a licensee/supplier (i.e. retailer) a free CD Rom of all customers connected to its distribution network. The CD is updated quarterly.

Yours sincerely,

ALEX HENNEY


ATTACHMENT 3

Dear Vanni,

As you and your colleagues did not provide adequate or correct answers to most of the questions I asked at the AGM, I restate them and would be grateful if you would answer the following outstanding points:-

  • Please provide in laymen's terms an analysis of the with-profits fund's available assets together with a comparison between, on the one hand, the available assets and, on the other hand, aggregate policy values, where the latter are differentiated between guaranteed and non-guaranteed elements and the annuitants. The clear intention of the FSA May publication "Feedback Statement on the With-Profits Review" is that the above information will be required in future
  • Please provide a proper analysis of the fund's performance i.e. return by asset class. The With-profits Review Issues Paper 3, Disclosure to Consumers, January 2002 states (p15) that there should be:
  • A statement of returns achieved by the with-profits fund:-

    i) the investment return achieved from the fund in which the customer's policy is invested
    ii) the average amount of that return credited to asset shares, and an explanation of any difference"

  • Please report the number of members currently in the with-profits fund. As required by the Companies Act the register of members is publicly available; it would be unreasonable to expect us to count those listed when the number must be readily available within the Society

In relation to the foregoing three points I note that Mr. Thomson has on occasion claimed that Equitable is more transparent in its reporting than other life funds.

" Please set out clearly the nature and implications of the GIR issue. You alleged that information about GIRs was included in the Compromise document, and the website report on the AGM Q&A session claimed that "…GIRs were fully described in the Compromise Scheme documents…". Unless I have missed relevant scripting, these claims are incorrect. The GIRs were not referred to in the first set of documentation sent out. They were not listed in the "Definitions" of Schedule D of the Compromise Document. They were mentioned briefly on pp100 and 102 of Appendix III, Summary of the Associated Actuary's Report and the summary of the Independent Actuary's Report merely alluded on p113 to "other guarantess accruing under policies"
.
Furthermore you and/or one of your colleagues made the claim that GIR and non-GIR policyholders were treated equally. It is true that so long as bonus rates to non-GIR policyholders are not less than that guaranteed to GIR policyholders, the two classes get the same bonus rate. But they are not treated equally since the GIR policyholders benefit from a guarantee and the guarantee is in fact given by the non-GIR policyholders to the extent that the guarantee can be honoured out of their policyholder funds with the Society. The apparent equality of treatment is therefore in fact of very unequal situations. In these circumstances there is an overriding need that the Board should now:-

* explain the risk that non-GIRs bear of possibly having to fund the GIR benefit if the return on the fund reduces below 3.5%. I suggest that this information is part of what the FSA's Issues Paper 3 means by explaining to consumers the risks of the with-profits product

* provide a reasoned explanation (rather than the one line assertion included in the AGM Q&A session) of why the Society did not address the GIR issue in the compromise (as EMAG urged it to do)

* clarify the implications of the GIR for investment policy which seem to be a matter of confusion. Thus the Appointed Actuary commented on p102 of the Compromise Document that "I expect that the Society's investment strategy would remain broadly the same in the short term as it is now…the high level of guarantees within the with-profits fund may severely restrict [investment in equities] for some time". This observation directly contradicts the contemporaneous claim by Thomson reported in The Times on 7/1/02:-

"Equitable Life has vowed to splash out £4 billion on buying shares, if the troubled insurer wins a crucial vote this week aimed at shoring up its ailing finances. Charles Thomson, chief executive of Equitable, told The Times that the insurer would halt a divestment programme triggered after a controversial ruling in the House of Lords effectively forced Equitable to close its doors to new business. Since then Equitable has steadily reduced its exposure to the equity markets from a peak of 60 per cent to today's level of 34 per cent…Mr. Thomson said: "If we get backing from our members over the compromise deal, we will bring the equity ratio back up to a fully competitive level. The current 34 per cent level is a low figure based on historical comparisons"."

I note the figure for equities is now 25 per cent.

Furthermore the extent of GIRs and the lack of reserves appear to render the Board's objective stated in "Equitable Life 2002 and Beyond" of "moving the with-profits fund closer towards being a conventional with-profits find" meaningless. That is unless the Board's plan to siphon off virtually all profits beyond that required to meet the GIRs plus a token bonus into building up reserves. I suggest it would be appropriate to explain how the Board intends to square this circle

Mr. Bellringer incorrectly claimed that the reason for the delay in providing the solvency return was due to a delay by the FSA in providing it to Companies House from where members and journalists could request it. In fact by virtue of Rule 9.7 of the interim "Prudential Source Book: Insurers" made pursuant to the Financial Services Act, policyholders have a right to receive "deposited documents" once they are deposited. There was thus nothing to stop the Society putting the return on its website the day after it was deposited with the FSA, nor to provide it to any policyholder or journalist who asked for it. I subsequently learned that when Mr. Bellringer offered an excuse to a number of professional actuaries who sought the solvency return, the Association of Consulting Actuaries sent him an e-mail asking him to stop playing games. My informant commented that it was clear that the objective was to keep the return under wraps until after the AG (as you kept the letter to the annuitants)

Either you or one of your colleagues suggested misleadingly that neither discussion of the GIR issue nor the appointed actuaries' policy that liabilities should be within +5% of asset values could be mentioned in the Annual Report, the content of which was statutorily prescribed. I note that the AGM Q&A session states that "The report is largely driven by the requirements of the Companies Act". This statement implies not only that the Companies Act prescribes the minimum of what must go in (which it does), but also that the Companies Act prescribes what may not go in, which is incorrect. S9 of Schedule 10 of the Companies Act 1989 states that "The directors' report should contain particulars of any matters…So far as they are material for the appreciation of the company's state of affairs by its members…". In my opinion both of the aforementioned matters meet that requirement.

I hope you will agree with me that directors should now provide adequate and accurate answers to questions put at an AGM. I cannot stress too strongly the damage done to the Society by making inaccurate or misleading statements and by the evasion of issues that are sooner or later identified by the responsible media as being relevant to policyholders' interests.

Finally I believe that unless the Board now publicly and candidly addresses the issues raised in this letter, and rapidly finds a way of enabling non-annuitants to substitute unit linked policies for their current interest in the with-profits fund, the Society will quite shortly find many except annuitants (who cannot move) will transfer their funds elsewhere unless even more punitive measures are adopted to prevent their doing so.

I reserve the right to copy this - and I hope in due course your reply - to our website and various journalists.

Yours sincerely,

ALEX HENNEY


ATTACHMENT 4

Response to my letter to Treves dated 13/6/02:

10 July 2002.

Dear Mr. Henney,

Thank you for your letter of the 13 June addressed to Vanni Treves. I am responding on his behalf.

Some of the information you request is beyond that which might be reasonably expected from any business, in an industry, seeking to maintain efficient operations and protect the interests of its customers or members.

The Society now publishes an Interim Report as well as the Annual Report and Accounts for the year ending 31 December. In these publications we detail the corporate activities of the period and a comprehensive financial report. We do not intend to produce selective corporate information outside of these reporting periods, which would be potentially misleading and costly. Much of the information requested is not, in any case, readily available and would become quickly out of date given current market uncertainty. To give any individual or small group selective information would be unfair to all other policyholders. The Interim Report, for the period ending 30 June, will be published in the autumn and made available to all policyholders by post and on our website.

On the matter of the FSA returns, clearly there was some confusion regarding availability of the annual returns brought about, we understand, by the new procedures introduced for filing. Like all parties concerned, we can learn from this too and, hopefully, next year will be a smoother process for all concerned. Very few policyholders have requested a copy. The FSA returns underline that the Society remained solvent and met the regulator's stringent required minimum margins for solvency.

I note your possible intent to post this correspondence on the Internet and issue it to journalists. You are, of course, free to do so and we have no problem in dealing with any journalist who may wish to speak with us on this matter. I fail to see, however, what the news value would be.

Yours sincerely,


Tony McGarahan
Chief Communications Officer


ATTACHMENT 5

7th October, 2002.

Dear Treves,

On 5th September I wrote as follows to Thomson:

"Article 65 of the Society's Articles of Association states "The Directors shall at such intervals as they deem expedient but at least once every three years…cause an investigation to be made into the financial condition of the Society…by the Actuary…the Directors report to the Members upon the results of the valuation". The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3RD Edition) defines the relevant meaning of the word "report" as follows:-

"An account brought by one person to another of some matter specially investigated".

"A formal statement of the results of an investigation, or of any matter on which definite information is required, made by same person or body instructed or required to do so".

While the Directors have made statements, they have not reported in the proper meaning of the word on the investigations made into the financial condition of the Society that led to cuts in policy value of July 2001, April 2002, July 2002. I would be obliged if you would provide the members of the Society with the reports as required by the Articles of Association by publishing them on the website."

I received the following reply from McGarahan on 16 September:

"The investigation under Article 65 is the annual valuation of the Society; published in the returns to the FSA, formerly to the Insurance Directorate. This document is on the Society's website."

The reference to timing in Article 65 is perhaps a feature of the Articles that need modernisation and I assume (I would be grateful if you would confirm this) that the Directors have decided on an annual investigation and valuation by the Actuary. This is mentioned as occurring in the section of the Directors' Report dated 15th April 2002 headed "Valuation and bonus declaration". Article 65 refers to a "Directors' report to members", not one to a regulatory authority and quite distinct from the Accounts prepared under Article 64. The intent of Article 65 has the Actuary reporting to the Board of Directors and then the Directors reporting to the members. Please note that the phrase "Provided that in the valuation of the assets the values thereof be not estimated beyond the market prices [if any] of the same ..." would seem to imply that future income should not be included unless "for reasons to be set out in the Directors' report to the members upon the results of the valuation". The Returns to the FSA include future income. There is nothing in the Directors report to members dated 15th April 2002 on future income. I can find nothing in the Articles of Association which refer to the provision of reports and notices to members in electronic form, and so the provision of a report on the website of the Society does not meet the requirements of the Articles [see Article 69]. I checked with Mr. Roger Allen, Head of the Insurance Division of the FSA. On Friday afternoon 27 September he advised me that solvency returns "are not used for valuing the assets and declaring bonuses. Valuation and bonuses are worked out from first principles. They [i.e. solvency returns] are not a tool in that process".

I repeat my request for the reports to which the members are entitled under Article 65. I would also be obliged if the Society cease trying to fob us off with obviously incorrect and misleading responses to our requests. While Mr. McGarahan may not know much about life insurance companies, we do.

Yours sincerely,

 

ALEX HENNEY

c.c. EMAG Committee, EMAG Website, Board, Journalists.